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Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger
Testt
DAVID R. DoW* & R. SCOTT SHIELDES"
"In the practice of the use of language one party calls out the words, the other
acts on them."'
A nineteen-year-old teenager speeding down a Texas highway south of
Houston did not hear the pursuing highway patrolman's siren because the CD
player in the stolen truck he was driving was blaring the rap lyrics of Tupac
Shakur.2 Eventually the teenager, a young man named Ronald Howard, did notice
the patrolman's flashing lights in his rearview mirror, and so he pulled to the side
of the road. As Officer Bill Davidson walked up to Howard's window, the
teenager pointed his semiautomatic handgun and fired. Officer Davidson died on
the side of the highway. Howard was prosecuted for capital murder. At his trial,
he put on a defense of diminished capacity, arguing, in essence, that the violent
Shakur lyrics were in part responsible for causing him to act as he did and that
his punishment should be mitigated accordingly. The jury sentenced Howard to
death.3
Howard's defense-his claim that the music made him do it-offends modem
notions of free will and responsibility, and the jury sensibly rejected it. At the
same time, this defense tells us everything we need to know about the central
defect of the clear and present danger test, for this test, which is central to
interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, 4 rests on the
morally unacceptable proposition that words alone can overcome human will.
The test ignores the morally salient distinction between speech and action,
f © 1998 by David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes.
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
** B.A. 1994, University of Texas-Austin; J.D. 1998, University of Houston Law Center.
1. LUDWIG WITrGENsTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 7, at 51 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., Alden & Mowbray Ltd., 3d ed. 1967) (1953) (internal cross-reference omitted).
2. The late Shakur produced so-called gangster rap music. The song the teenager was
listening to was "Crooked Ass Nigga." It includes the following lyrics: "Coming quickly up
the street, is the punk ass police / The first one jumped out and said freeze / I popped him in
his knees and shot him punk please." 2PAC, Crooked Ass Nigga, on 2PACALYPSE NOW
(Interscope Records/Atlantic 1991).
3. See Michele Munn, Note, The Effects of Free Speech, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 433, 467-68
(1994). In addition to the criminal trial, Officer Davidson's family filed suit in a Texas district
court seeking damages from Shakur, Atlantic Records, and Time Warner, Inc., claiming a
causal connection between the music and Howard's actions. See Mike Quinlan & Jim Persels,
It's Not My Fault, the Devil Made Me Do It: Attempting to Impose Tort Liability on
Publishers, Producers, and Artists for Injuries Allegedly "Inspired" by Media Speech, 18 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 417,418-19 (1994).
4. Many of the earlier free-speech cases, such as Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919), may be characterized as falling within the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment. Despite this potential characterization, this Article will focus primarily on the
Free Speech Clause.
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between saying and doing. Consequently, the same sentiment that moved jurors
to reject Howard's mitigation defense should move constitutional theorists to
jettison the clear and present danger test.
INTRODUCTION
Without the freedom to speak, all our other freedoms are empty.' In the history
of American law, many jurists have recognized that the First Amendment is our
most precious freedom,6 yet few have been willing to admit that the
jurisprudential core of Free Speech Clause doctrine is a constitutional
embarrassment because it is philosophically untenable.7 The clear and present
danger test ("CPD test") has been used for three-quarters of a century, in one
form or another, to determine which utterances the government may legitimately
restrain. This test, however, is inimical to our core values. While it is thought to
be expansive, it in fact protects too little speech. We argue in this Article that the
CPD test ought to be abandoned and replaced with a nearly categorical
prohibition. The Free Speech Clause should protect all speech unless three
5. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I have
always believed that the First Amendment is the keystone of our Government, that the freedoms
it guarantees provide the best insurance against destruction of all freedom."); Steven Shiffrin,
Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1197-98 (1983)
(remarking that free speech is supported by a multiplicity of values including "individual self-
expression, social communion, political participation, the search for truth and for informed
choice, social catharsis, the social affirmation of the rights of equality, dignity, and respect, and
the freedom from arbitrary, official aggrandizing or excessively intrusive government
regulation").
6. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can
preserve a free government .... "), overruled in part by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 590 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (calling free speech "the glory of our
system of government"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (remarking that "one may
say that [the freedom of speech] is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom"); OWEN M. FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 9 (1996) ("Freedom of speech
is one of the most remarkable aspects of American constitutional law."); SUSAN FORD
WILTSHIRE, GREECE, ROME, AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 103 (1992) ("For many people the First
Amendment is the heart of the Bill of Rights.").
7. See Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap:
Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Particularly Urgent for the
Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and Bring
Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV.
883 (1996). Professor Freedman recognizes a disintegration of First Amendment doctrine. He
characterizes current free-speech law as follows:
Current free speech law resembles the Ptolomaic system of astronomy in its last
days. Just as that theory grew increasingly incoherent in an attempt to incorporate
new empirical observations that were inconsistent with its basic postulates, so is
First Amendment doctrine disintegrating as cases reviewing restraints on speech
strive to paper over the fact that analyses based on presuppositions as to the value
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conditions are satisfied: (1) the speaker's specific intent in uttering the speech
is to cause an unlawful injury, (2) the injury in fact occurs as a proximate result
of the speech, and (3) the speaker, through his or her speech, overwhelmed (i.e.,
controlled) the will of the listener.
This test we propose would permit almost no speech whatsoever to be
punished, and it is superior to the CPD test for two reasons. The first is that the
basic evil that gave rise to the CPD test was phantasmagoric, a figment of a
collective paranoid imagination. Words do not lead inexorably to evil, yet the
creators of the CPD test were so terrified of the anarcho-Communist specter8 that
they crafted a dubious doctrine. Second, unlike the test we propose, the CPD test
cannot coexist with those modem notions of individual responsibility that
underlie our laws and our form of government itself. The same rationale that
permits the CPD test to silence speech permits criminal defendants like Ronald
Howard compellingly to attribute their murderous acts to someone else's speech.
Our argument in this Article consists of two parts. In the first, we review very
briefly the cases that developed the CPD test. This terrain has been heavily
traversed, and our objectives primarily are to reiterate the historical context in
which the cases arose and to linger over the development of the linguistic
formulation of the CPD test itself. Part II presents the argument and consists of
two strands. Initially we contend that the historical circumstances that gave rise
to the CPD test should make us exceedingly wary of the test itself. Next we insist
that the CPD test is inconsistent with modem notions of moral responsibility.
I. THE SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSING LEGAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES
Hard cases are known to make bad law. But that aphorism is not limited to
judge-made law. It applies with equal force to statutes enacted by Congress. The
CPD test cannot be blamed entirely on the courts. Indeed, the blame must be
shared at least in equal measure by Congress, and various state legislatures,
which equated patriotism with the stifling of all dissent and, at the same time,
exhibited such an irrational fear, first of German militarism9 and later of
Communist subversion, that it can fairly be described as paranoia.
A. The Espionage Act: Schenck
On April 6, 1917, Congress voted by joint resolution to enter World War I.
Two months later, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which created three new
8. See infra Part I (detailing the American political and legal responses to German
militarism, anarchism, and Communism from 1917 through the 1950s).
9. For an example of the extent to which Americans acted out of fear of Germans see
WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE 310 (1989) (relating an incident in which a mob in
Collinsville, Illinois "decided that a town resident was a German spy ... then seized him,
wrapped him in a U.S. flag, and murdered him").
12191998]
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federal offenses.' 0 The first new offense pertained to creating or conveying false
reports or false statements with the intent of interfering with American military
efforts or of assisting American "enemies."" The second offense included
causing or attempting to cause "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal
of duty" in the United States armed forces. 2 The third new offense involved
obstruction of the draft. 3 In short, Congress had made criticism of government
policy during a time of war a federal crime. 4
One month after the passage of the Espionage Act, Judge Learned Hand, then
a federal district court judge in New York, decided the case of Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten.5 The plaintiff was a publishing company that produced
a monthly magazine called "The Masses," which consisted of cartoons, political
commentary, prose, and poetry from contributors such as Carl Sandburg and
Robert Henri.' 6 The Postmaster General found that the August 1917 issue of the
magazine violated three provisions of the Espionage Act, and he instructed the
New York postmaster to declare the issue nonmailable.7 The plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the postmaster from declaring The Masses
nonmailable. 8
Hand determined that The Masses did not violate the Espionage Act because
it did not explicitly urge violations of the Act.'9 However, the Second Circuit
swiftly reversed his decision.2" In an opinion written by Judge Rogers, the court
of appeals concluded that "[i]f the natural and reasonable effect of what is said
is to encourage resistance to the law, it is immaterial that the duty to resist is not
mentioned, or the interest of the persons addressed in resistance is not
suggested."'" Hand believed that the stridency of the speaker's speech was the
pivotal fact; the Second Circuit, in contrast, believed that the reasonably
predictable consequences of the speech were what riattered most.
10. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTITTIoNAL LAw 1009 n.3 (12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter
CoNsTrTIoNAL LAW]. For a discussion of the statute and its history see GERALD GUNTHER,
LEARNED HAND 151 (1994) [hereinafter LEARNED HAND]; David M. Rabban, The Emergence
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205, 1217-27 (1983).
11. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1994)); see also Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 538-39
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
12. Espionage Act § 3, 40 Stat. at 219; see also Masses Publ'g Co., 244 F. at 539-40.
13. See Espionage Act § 3, 40 Stat. at 219; see also Masses Publ'g Co., 244 F. at 540.
14. See LEARNED HAND, supra note 10, at 151; see also Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S.
239 (1920) (upholding the conviction of a clergyman who distributed a four-page pamphlet
decrying war); LAFEBER, supra note 9, at 310 (remarking that the Espionage Act allowed the
government to arrest anyone simply suspected of being critical of the war effort).
15. 244 F. 535.
16. See id.; LEARNED HAND, supra note 10, at 153.
17. See Masses Publ'g Co., 244 F. at 536. More specifically, the Postmaster General
objected to four cartoons, as well as a "sprinkl[ing of] other texts designed to arouse animosity
to the draft and to the war, and criticisms of the President's consistency in favoring the
declaration of war." Id. at 537.
18. See id. at 537.
19. See id. at 538-41.
20. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
21. Id. at 38.
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Two years later the Supreme Court decided Schenck v. United States.22 The
defendant in Schenck, who was the general secretary of the Socialist Party, had
mailed leaflets to men who had been drafted for service in World War I. The
leaflet railed against the draft as a tool of a despotic Wall Street elite, alleged that
there existed a constitutional right to oppose the draft, and concluded by saying
that the leaflet recipients "must do [their] share to maintain, support and uphold
the rights of the people of this country."' Justice Holmes, writing for a
unanimous Court, affirmed Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act.24 In
so doing, he formulated the CPD test:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.'
As one example of the kind of speech that would constitute a clear and present
danger, Holmes created the well-known metaphor of someone's falsely shouting
fire in a theater, thereby causing a panic.26
Holmes assumed at the outset of his analysis that there comes a moment when
speech becomes an act; at that moment, the act of speaking may constitute a
punishable act. As an illustration of this moment, Holmes cited Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co." In Gompers, a court had enjoined the defendants
from publishing statements that Bucks Stove & Range Company was ever on the
American Federation of Labor's "Unfair" or "We Don't Patronize" lists. 28 The
Supreme Court reversed the criminal contempt convictions,29 but it also noted
that an injunction may at times be warranted to prevent certain speech that,
because of the prevailing circumstances, constitutes an act.30 Justice Lamar,
writing for the Court in Gompers, reasoned as follows: The law allows
workingmen to organize unions as a means of coalescing power; this united
power may become so vast as to render an individual helpless by forcing that
individual either to submit to the will of the union or to seek an equitable
remedy; consequently, where unions speak against an individual (for instance,
by declaring that the individual is "unfair"), and the individual has no means of
seeking peace but through submission or equitable remedy, then the force of the
speech may be so great as to constitute a "verbal act."'"
Holmes, by relying on Gompers, accepted the proposition that saying can be
tantamount to doing. Then, a week after the Schenck decision, Holmes applied
22. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
23. Id. at 51 (alteration added) (quotations omitted).
24. See id at 53.
25. Id at 52.
26. See id.
27. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
28. See id at 436.
29. See id at 452.
30. See id. at 439; see also Schenck 249 U.S. at 52 (stating that under the authority of
Gompers, the First Amendment "does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that may have all the effect of force").
31. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 439.
1998] 1221
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the CPD test in two other Espionage Act cases: Frohwerk v. United States32 and
Debs v. United States.3 In Frohwerk, Holmes affirmed the conviction of the
publisher of the newspaper Missouri Staats Zeitung for conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act.34 The newspaper declared American involvement in World War
I a mistake, analyzed the draft as illegal, argued that Wall Street elites were the
cause of the war, and intoned, "'[w]e say, therefore, cease firing. ' ' 31 In Debs,
Holmes affirmed the conviction of Eugene Debs, the perennial Socialist Party
candidate for President of the United States.36 Debs had been convicted of
violating the Espionage Act after giving a speech in which he discussed the
merits of socialism, "expressed opposition to Prussian militarism," praised other
Socialists who had been jailed for obstructing the draft, and declared that the
listeners were fit for more than "slavery and cannon fodder."37 In reviewing the
trial record, Holmes reasoned that Debs could be punished if the evidence
showed that the natural and reasonably probable effects of his words would
cause obstruction of the draft.33
B. The Espionage Act: Bad Tendency Versus Incitement
Many of the lower federal courts, when they first began to try Espionage Act
cases, addressed the First Amendment issue by applying what has been called the
"bad tendency" approach to free speech.39 The bad-tendency approach was based
largely on the traditional principle of intent, which holds that an actor's intent
may be presumed, in light of the surrounding circumstances, from the natural and
usual consequences of his acts.4" We say that a person intends to cause those
effects that a reasonable person would have assumed to be the natural and usual
consequences of his action. Accordingly, the bad-tendency approach to free
speech held that where the consequences of speech could be bad, then the
speaker intended those bad consequences and could therefore be punished for his
speech. By using this concept of intent, the bad-tendency test collapsed speech
into the action said to be a possible result of that speech (or, to use the language
of causation, the test collapsed speech into the action that could possibly be
caused by the speech), and the test permitted the speaker to be punished for that
potential action.
The bad-tendency approach, therefore, rested on two propositions. The first
was that speech is an act. If the act of speech will tend to cause ill effects, then
32. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
33. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
34. See Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205.
35. Id. at 207 (alteration added) (quoting an issue of Missouri Staats Zeitung).
36. For an interesting account of Eugene Debs see David Ray Papke, Eugene Debs as Legal
Heretic: The Law-Related Conversion, Catechism and Evangelism of an American Socialist,
63 U. CiN. L. REv. 339 (1994). President Warren G. Harding pardoned Debs in 1921. See
LAFEBER, supra note 9, at 3 10.
37. Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-14.
38. See id. at 216.
39. See Rabban, supra note 10, at 1229.
40. See id. at 1230-31.
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the speech is subject to punishment. The second proposition, was that in
measuring the potential ill effects of certain speech, the proper test was to ask
simply whether it was reasonable to assume that certain ill effects would follow.
Not all lower court judges followed the bad-tendency approach." Some
employed what has been characterized as the "incitement" approach.42 This
approach originated with Judge Hand's opinion in Masses Publishing Co. Hand,
as Professor Gunther has put it, asked one question: "When, if at all, may the
state penalize political dissenters ... ?""4 Clearly, Judge Hand believed, the state
may punish a speaker who makes statements of fact that the speaker either knows
or believes to be false." And in addition to having the power to punish falsity,
the state also had the power, in Hand's view, to punish certain statements that,
irrespective of their truth content, would cause ill consequences. Yet Hand was
famously uncomfortable with the malleability of the concept of causation. For
example, Hand agreed that discontented soldiers who believe they are capitalist
tools will be more prone to insubordination than those soldiers who believe in the
military action at hand;4" but Hand believed that interpreting the Espionage Act's
insubordination provision's use of the word "cause" so broadly as to encompass
any statement that might have the effect of arousing discontent would inevitably
suppress all "opinion except what encouraged and supported the existing
policies."46 In other words, while Hand accepted the first premise of the bad-
tendency test-that speech is action-he resisted the conclusion that the speech
may be punished merely because it is reasonable to believe that bad
consequences will follow. Hand thought that the state's basis for acting had to
be more than merely reasonable.
Consequently, Hand laid down the argument for the incitement approach to
free speech. Initially, he reiterated that a person may not counsel or advise
another to violate existing law.47 However, to counsel or advise another,
according to Hand, means "to urge upon him either that it is his interest or his
duty" to violate the existing law.48 Under Hand's approach, a speaker could
criticize draft laws unless that criticism took the form of urging listeners that
41. See id. at 1235-44.
42. See LEARNED HAND, supra note 10, at 157.
43. Id. at 151.
44. See id. at 162-63. The power to punish falsity, however, does not permit the state to
punish statements of opinion or criticism, which speakers generally regard as true, or at the
very least as not false. "Opinions," insisted Hand, "are at best provisional hypotheses,
incompletely tested." Id at 163 (quotations omitted). In a letter to Justice Holmes, Hand argued
that because we each doubt to some degree the credulity of our own opinions, we must be
tolerant of the opinions of others. See id.
45. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917).
46. Id. at 540. Hand was obviously concerned with the First Amendment here, but his
opinion actually includes a significant fudge. Hand added that even if Congress could suppress
all such opinion in time of war, because the exercise of that power is contrary to democratic
principles, he would not believe that Congress had intended to do so without the "clearest
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they had the duty to dodge the draft. Where a speaker "stops short of urging upon
others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law .... one should not be
held to have attempted to cause its violation. '49 It is not enough for the state
merely to say that it is reasonable that some listeners will dodge the draft as a
consequence of the speaker's speech; the state loses unless it can.also show that
the speaker urged that very action.
C. The Smith Act and Dennis
In 1940, Congress passed the Smith Act, the first peacetime sedition law
passed by Congress since the Sedition Act of 1789."° Section 2 of the Act
prohibited the knowing or willful advocacy or teaching of the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the United States Government by force
or violence."' The statute also prohibited the organization of groups teaching the
forcible overthrow of the government.5 2 Section 3 of the Act prohibited attempts
and conspiracies to violate section 2." Though Congress modeled the statute on
state prohibitions of criminal anarchy, the Smith Act was primarily used as a
method of punishing Communists during a period of fervent anti-Communist
sentiment.
The statute gained prominence during a period known as the "Red Scare." 4 In
the summer of 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded the West-controlled sections
of Berlin, prompting a massive Allied airlift of supplies."5 In the summer of
1950, Julius and Ethel Rosenburg were executed for passing atomic secrets to the
Soviet Union. 6 That same summer, a judge sent five people, who had written
"PEACE" on a wall in Brooklyn, to jail because he suspected that they were
49. Id.
50. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 562 n.2 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Professor Gunther characterizes the Sedition Act of 1789 as being "enacted by the Federalists
because of widespread hostility to ideas stemming from the French Revolution."
CONsTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 998. Further, notes Gunther, the Act was "rigorously
enforced, entirely against Jefferson Republicans," until the Federalists were defeated in 1800,
and Jefferson pardoned all of those convicted under the Act. Id.
51. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 496.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 497.
54. See LAFEBER, supra note 9, at 452-55. LaFeber attributes the beginning of the Red
Scare to President Truman's speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, in which he
established his eponymous doctrine. In that speech, Truman divided the world between "free
peoples" and governments that relied upon "terror and oppression." Id. at 453. It was up to
Congress to decide on which side to fall. Later that year, Truman ordered a federal loyalty plan
in order to uncover Communists working within the government. See also Alan I. Bigel, The
First Amendment and National Security: The Court Responds to Governmental Harassment
of Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 Offlo N.U. L. REv. 885, 899-905 (1993) (noting
executive orders issued by Truman to investigate loyalty of government officials). Soon,
however, Truman lost control of this Red Scare to what LaFeber characterizes as "less
responsible politicians," such as Senator Joseph McCarthy. LAFEBER, supra note 9, at 455.
55. See LAFEBER, supra note 9, at 460-61.
56. See id. at 497.
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Communists. 7 Finally, Senator Joseph McCarthy, searching for an issue to win
re-election in 1952, latched onto the pervading anti-Communist sensibilities by
initiating the era of McCarthyism. 8 This era, from 1950 to 1955, was marked by
a "ruthless search for Communists... conducted without evidence but publicly
and in a manner that destroyed the reputations of its targets." 9
In the midst of this Red Scare, in 1949, eleven defendants, leaders of the
Communist Party of America, were convicted of violating the Smith Act6 The
evil that the group presented, argued the government, was the Party's advocacy
of the forcible overthrow of the United States Government at the most propitious
moment' On appeal, the defendants' main defense relied on clear and present
danger.6 They argued that their political doctrine required the use of force only
after securing power through constitutional means. 3 Because their teachings did
not present a clear and present danger to the United States Government, they
asserted, the convictions should be reversed."
The Second Circuit, however, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Hand,
affirmed the convictions.6 Hand posed the question of "what limits, if any, the
advocacy of illegal means imposes upon the privilege which the aims or purposes
of the utterer would otherwise enjoy."66 In answering this question, Hand
assumed that it is obvious that the First Amendment does not protect the leader
of a mob who gives the word "go" to a group of individuals already ripe to begin
rioting. 7 Why this is obvious Hand did not say; he simply assumed that the only
difficult question arises when "persuasion and instigation [are] inseparably
confused."68 To deal with this problem, Hand introduced his own formulation of
the CPD test69 (a formula reminiscent of his earlier negligence formula
introduced in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 71). "In each case," Judge Hand
said, "[we] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."'" On this basis, the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, and on
57. See id.
58. See &L at 484-85.
59. Id. at 484.
60. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,497 (1951).
61. See id.
62. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494.
63. See id. More specifically, they argued that violence would only become necessary
during the dictatorial transitional phase to communism, rather than as a means of securing
proletariat success over the capitalist state. See id.
64. See id. at 212-13.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 207.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See LEARNED HAND, supra note 10, at 599.
70. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
71. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212; see also Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic
Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1986). Posner reduces this formula to the following
symbols: B < PL, where B is the cost of regulation, P is the probability that the speech will
cause harm, and L is the magnitude of the harm. See id.; see also HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
1998] 1225
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review, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice
Vinson, not only affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment but also adopted Judge
Hand's formulation of the legal rule.
D. Linguistic Evolution
Holmes's CPD test has generated volumes of controversy and commentary.
Professor Rabban, for example, views the test merely as a continuation of the
bad-tendency approach taken by the lower federal courts.72 In contrast, Professor
Kalven felt that it was much closer to Hand's incitement argument.73 Zechariah
Chafee actually argued that the CPD test represented the libertarian ideal of free
speech.74 On the other hand, Alexander Mieklejohn attacked the doctrine as one
that "'annuls the most significant purpose of the First Amendment... [viz.,] self-
government." 7 5
What all these commentators agree on, though, is that the only relevant
question in any of the tests-bad-tendency, incitement, or CPD-deals with how
certain the state must be that bad action will follow speech in order for the state
to have the power to ban the speech itself. Under all three approaches the state
can act against the speaker even if the speaker is not directly urging the listener
to break the law. To be sure, Holmes was somewhat more comfortable with this
notion than Hand was, but the question was simply one of degree.76
WORTHY TRADITION 198 (1988) (calling Hand's formulation a discounted Holmes test).
72. See Rabban, supra note 10, at 1265.
73. See KALVEN, supra note 71, at 133-34. Professor Kalven finds the use of the fire
example trivial and misleading because it simply impeaches the premise that the First
Amendment protects all speech, and does not begin to respond to the complex premises
surrounding political speech. See id. Additionally, Kalven argues, "[i]f the point were that only
speech which is a comparable 'trigger of action' could be regulated, the example might prove
a stirring way of drawing the line at incitement." Id. at 133 (emphasis in original).
74. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932
(1919). Chafee's view has been discredited as revisionist. For a thorough examination of
Chafee's revisionist interpretation of Holmes's CPD test see Rabban, supra note 10, at 1283-
303. See also LEARNED HAND, supra note 10, at 164; id at 168 (quoting a letter that Hand sent
to Chafee in which Hand wrote, "You have, I dare say, done well to take what has fallen from
Heaven and insist that it is manna rather than to set up any independent solution.").
75. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567 n.9 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(omission and alteration added) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 29 (1948)).
76. Upon reading Schenck, Hand attempted to persuade Holmes that incitement was the
better standard. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 758 (1975). While
Hand conceded that speech may lead to unlawful acts by influencing others, he remarked that:
[R]esponsibility does not go pai passu. I do not understand that the rule of
responsibility for speech has ever been that the result is known as likely to follow.
It is not.., a question of responsibility dependent upon reasonable forecast, with
an excuse when the words, had another possible effect. [Instead, tjhe
responsibility only began when the words were directly an incitement.
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The key words in Holmes's test were "proximity and degree." The struggle
over how to apply them began only a few months after Schenck. Thus, in Abrams
v. United States" the Court upheld the convictions of five Russian emigrants who
had planned to distribute two leaflets, one in English and the other in Yiddish,
to workers in ammunition factories.78 The leaflets described President Wilson as
a hypocrite, denounced American involvement in World War I as a capitalist ploy
to intervene in the Russian Revolution, and claimed that the proper reply to this
intervention should be a general strike." Justice Clarke, writing for the majority,
interpreted the main purpose of the leaflets as an attempt to interfere with
American war plans through a general strike halting the production of munitions
(despite the fact that the express purpose of the leaflets was to stop American
involvement in Russian internal affairs).8" In other words, in affirming the
convictions, the Court accepted the view that a speaker's intent may be
interpreted simply from the reasonably probable consequences of his speech,
rather than from a more specific intent as evidenced by the words themselves.
Holmes and Brandeis dissented."' Holmes recognized that the ordinary concept
of intent meant "knowledge at the time of the act that the consequences said to
be intended will ensue."82 But where speech is deemed to be an act, he argued,
"a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence
is the aim of the deed."3 Holmes professed in Abrams to be adhering to the CPD
test, yet he clearly tightened it. 4 As he put it:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify
punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may
punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States may constitutionally seek to prevent."5
Holmes has replaced the word "present" with the word "imminent," and he
concluded that there was no imminent danger possibly presented by
"publi[cation] of a silly little leaflet by an unknown man." 6 Holmes had drifted
towards Hand's view that the danger presented by the speech must be
77. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
78. See id at 617-18.
79. See id. at 619-22.
80. See id. at 623.
81. See id. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It was also in his Abrams dissent
that Holmes made his famous statement that the freedom of speech is meant to protect the
marketplace of ideas, and that the best test for truth is to allow an idea to enter into the market
in order to be either bought or rejected. See id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
84. There has been considerable debate concerning Holmes's change of heart in Abrams.
See, e.g., G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech
Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391, 427 (1992) (noting thatAbrams
represented a major turning point for Holmes). Chief Justice Vinson, in contrast, continued to
insist that Holmes's basic principle never wavered. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
505 (1951).
85. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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exceedingly clear, but this, of course, was a point about causation;87 neither
Holmes nor Brandeis repudiated the doctrinal premise that some speech could
indeed be treated as action.
Over the next two decades the Court's majority, in reviewing convictions under
state syndicalism statutes, continued the steady movement toward the bad-
tendency approach, while Holmes and Brandeis cemented their resistance.88 For
example, in Gitlow v. New York, 9 the Court upheld New York's criminal-
anarchy statutes. 90 Benjamin Gitlow, a member of the Socialist Party, had
published and circulated a writing called "The Left Wing Manifesto" and a paper
called "The Revolutionary Age."9 ' The Manifesto criticized the parliamentarism
of moderate socialism as inferior to a more mobilized revolutionary socialism,
which generally takes the form of "mass political strikes." 92 The Manifesto then
cited recent strikes in Winnipeg and Seattle as starting points from which a mass
political strike could be launched in order to bring about revolution and the end
of the parliamentary state.93 Gitlow ended the Manifesto by urging: "The
Communist International calls the proletariat of the world to the final struggle!"'94
The Supreme Court, in affirming Gitlow's convictions, reasoned that the right
to free speech does not defeat the state's "essential" right of self-preservation. 95
A state may treat speech as action, and punish it, if the speech causes the state
to fear for its very existence. 96
87. See id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (referring to the Russians as "puny
anonymities"). Holmes did continue to believe that congressional power to prevent substantive
evils may be greater in times of war because there are certain dangers inherent only in war.
Despite these inherent dangers, however, "the principle of the right to free speech is always the
same." Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). What is different is simply the imminence of the
danger presented by certain speech. But see Posner, supra note 71, at 7 (arguing that Holmes
went too far).
88. With World War I over and a new Communist regime in Russia, America entered an
era marked by fervent hatred of various forms of radicalism. During this period, states passed
laws punishing criminal anarchy and criminal syndicalism. For an interesting examination of
criminal syndicalism in a more modem context see Lawrence F. Reger, Montana's Criminal
Syndicalism Statute: An Affront to the First Amendment, 58 MONT. L. REv. 287 (1997).
89. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
90. New York's statutes had been passed in 1902, shortly after the assassination of
President McKinley. The New York statute defined criminal anarchy as the "'doctrine that
organized government should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of...
officials of government, or by any unlawful means."' Id at 654 (omission added) (quoting NEW
YORK PENAL LAW § 160 (Consol. 1909)). The statute also defined advocacy of criminal
anarchy as advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of criminal
anarchy by word of mouth or writing. See id. (quoting NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 161(1)).
91. See id. at 655.
92. Id. at 656-58.
93. See id. at 658-59.
94. Id at 660 n.2 (quotations omitted).
95. Id. at 668.
96. See id. In Gitlow, the Court accepted the state's legislative judgment that the Manifesto
would tend to produce bad effects. Holmes, joined by Brandeis, again dissented on the basis
that there appeared no real danger presented in the Manifesto. See id. at 673 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). And danger, if there was one, was directed toward an indefinite period in the future
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Two years later, in Whitney v. California,97 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act.9 Whitney had been
convicted of violating the Act by assisting in the formation of the Communist
Labor Party of California, a local chapter of the Communist Labor Party of
America.99 Essentially, the criminal nature of Miss Whitney's actions stemmed
from the fact that the Communist Party's main purpose was "to create a unified
revolutionary working class movement in America... to conquer the capitalist
state."'0 0 In affirming her conviction, the Court insisted that a statute like
California's should be declared unconstitutional only if the legislature was
arbitrary or unreasonable in passing it.'0 Because the statute prohibited acts akin
to criminal conspiracy, and because "united and joint action involves even
greater danger to [the state] than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals,"
the Court regarded the statute as perfectly reasonable.0 2
Brandeis, in a concurring opinion joined by Holmes, worried that an obsessive
focus on whether the state itself perceives that certain speech presents a grave
danger will eviscerate the Free Speech Clause, because the state will frequently
exaggerate the potential evil of radical discourse. Brandeis recalled, for example,
that "[m]en feared witches and burnt women."'0 3 Fear alone is therefore not
enough; the state's fear must be reasonable, and reasonableness, according to
Brandeis, is best ascertained by applying the concept of clear and present
danger.0 4 To show clear and present danger, the state must show "either that
immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past
conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then
contemplated."'0 5
Neither Brandeis nor Holmes was retreating from the crucial proposition that
speech could be action; they were instead insisting that courts police the
causation issue more vigorously. Moreover, although both Holmes and Brandeis
rather than "at once." As Holmes put it, "whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse
before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration." Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
(And even that long-term danger was trivial.) But see Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
In Fiske, the Court reversed the conviction of a member of the Industrial Workers of the World
("IWW") under Kansas's criminal-syndicalism statutes for recruiting IWW members. See id.
at 386. The defendant had been convicted based solely on the preamble of the IWW
constitution, which called for the abolition of the wage system. See id Looking at the language
of the preamble "standing alone," Justice Sanford concluded that because the IWW advocated
abolition of the wage system by lawful means, it differed essentially from the Gitlow Manifesto.
Id.; see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) ("Deference
to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at
stake."); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
97.274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled inpart by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
98. See id. at 372.
99. See id. at 360, 364.
100. Id. at 363.
101. See id. at 370.
102. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
104. See id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
105. Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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argued that the state can justify suppression of speech only in cases of
emergency, °6 they also agreed that California's perception of an emergency was
reasonable. Even the two most liberal guardians of the Free Speech Clause
believed that the threat presented by large numbers of persons, like Whitney,
"going from place to place" advocating criminal syndicalism was sufficient to
justify removal of First Amendment protection.107
E. Proliferation and Denouement
Once articulated, the CPD test, whatever it meant, came to be applied to a
smorgasbord of contexts where the state punished speech or expression. It was
applied to cases dealing with contempt of court;. 8 to cases challenging the
validity of state statutes,'0 9 as well as those challenging the validity of local
ordinances or regulations;" 0 and to cases presenting common-law offenses."'
106. See id at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
263 (1941) (requiring "that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high," at least in the context of contempt of court).
107. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108. See Bridges, 314 U.S. 252 (reversing contempt conviction). "[T]he 'clear and present
danger' language of the Schenck case has afforded practical guidance in a great variety of cases
in which the scope of constitutional protections of freedom of expression was in issue." Id. at
262; see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (reversing contempt conviction). "The fires
which [the language] kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration. ofjustice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately
imperil." Id. at 376.
109. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding state statute prohibiting
picketing invalid). "Abridgment of the liberty of [peaceful and truthful disbussion of matters
of public interest] can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion." Id at 104-05; see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945) (holding state statute requiring registration of labor organizers invalid as applied).
[A]ny attempt to restrict [the freedom of speech] must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.
The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed,
which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process
grounds, will not suffice.
Id at 530.
110. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a
requirement that school children salute the flag). "[The freedoms of speech and of the press]
are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect." Id. at 639.
111. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing a conviction of common-
law breach of the peace). "When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with
traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious." Id. at 308; see also Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Court prohibited a college from denying student-
organization status to a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, when the group
followed the proper filing guidelines and there had been no showing that the group refused to
abide by reasonable campus regulations. See id. at 184, 191. The siguificance of Healy is that
it expanded the application of clear and present danger from criminal sanctions to
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While the Court generally reversed the convictions at issue in all these contexts,
it remains significant that it did so by applying-and thereby entrenching-a test
born in an atmosphere of fear that the government would fall, a test, moreover,
that treated some speech as action.
During the midst of this rapid expansion of the use of the CPD test, the Court
decided Dennis v. United States"2 and adopted Judge Hand's formulation of the
CPD test. Hand himself had located the formulation attributed to him in
Brandeis's Whitney concurrence. Whereas Brandeis noted that if a danger is not
imminent, public discourse can be relied upon to prove the utterance wrong,"'
Hand reasoned that the requisite proof period may not exist in cases of
incitement." 4 That is, Hand argued that, as a matter of definition, incitement
creates imminent harm. Yet, it is also worth noting that Hand also believed that
the Communist threat was imminent."5 He compared the Communist presence in
Europe to the historical movement of Islam, a movement "always agitating to
increase their power,""' and he pointed to the Berlin blockade as evidence of the
tense international scene, a tinderbox in which a spark could lead to war."'
Following Dennis, the Court attempted to clarify its approach in Yates v.
United States." In Yates, the Court reversed the convictions of several "lower
echelon"" 9 members of the Communist Party of America, who had been
convicted of advocating and organizing a group advocating the forcible
overthrow of the government. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, based the
administrative sanctions. See also id at 202 (Rehnquist J., concurring) (taking issue with such
an extension).
112. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
113. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled inpart by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). "If there be a time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Id.
114. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affid, 341 U.S. 494.
115. See id.
116. Id at 213. Hand referred to Communism in religious terms at several points throughout
his opinion. He referred to its adherents as "infused with a passionate Utopian faith." Id at 212.
Additionally, Communism "has its Founder, its apostles, its sacred texts-perhaps even its
martyrs." Id. Ironically, it is this religious aspect which caused Hand to personally detest
having to uphold the conviction. Hand wrote in a letter:
"For myself, although of course it has nothing to do with my job or what was
before me in [Dennis], I deprecated the prosecution! If one is going to take any
action against Communism, it is of no use to put some of the leaders in prison for
three or four years. 'The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church."'
LEARNED HAND, supra note 10, at 603 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Learned
Hand to Bernard Berenson (June 11, 1951)). "'Personally I should never have prosecuted those
birds.... So far as this will do anything, it will encourage the faithful and maybe help the
Committee on Propaganda."' Id (omission in original) (quoting Letter from Hand to Berenson
(June 11, 1951)). Gerald Gunther attributes Hand's speech-restrictive decision in Dennis,
despite his personal animus to prosecution, as stemming from Hand's role as a lower court
judge bound by Supreme Court precedents. See id. at 603-04.
117. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 213.
118.354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled in part by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
119. Id. at 345 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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reversal on the inappropriateness of the jury instructions. 2o At trial, the judge
had instructed the jury that in order to convict, it must find that the Party
members advocated not only the desirability and propriety of overthrowing the
government, but the necessity and duty of forcible overthrow.' In other words,
the trial judge recited Hand's Masses Publishing Co. incitement test. However,
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, found that the trial judge's instructions
"misconceived" Dennis.'22
Harlan first defined the essence of Dennis as holding that
indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action, as well as
exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy found to be directed to "action
for the accomplishment" of forcible overthrow, to violence as "a rule or
principle of action," and employing "language of incitement," is not
constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size and
cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances
are such as reasonably to justify apprehension that action will occur. 23
In Justice Harlan's view, Dennis concerned itself with a conspiracy to advocate
in the present the future forcible overthrow of the government rather than a
conspiracy to advocate in the future the future forcible overthrow of the
government. 4 In the former conspiracy, only action is suspended, whereas in the
latter conspiracy, the advocacy is suspended. The essential (and highly subtle)
difference for Harlan lies between advocacy to do something and advocacy to
believe in something. 25 Because the trial judge did not make this distinction,
Harlan felt that a jury might give too much weight to evidence including vague
references to unspecified revolutionary action.
26
Whatever its merits, Harlan's attempt to establish a subtle difference between
advocacy to do and advocacy to believe was short-lived. In Brandenburg v.
120. See id. at 312-27.
121. See id. at 314-15.
122. Id. at 324.
123. Id. at 321 (citation omitted) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511-12
(1951)).
124. See id. at 324.
125. See id. at 324-25.
126. See id. at 327. Following the decision in Yates, the United States prosecuted
Communists under the membership clause of the Smith Act. Section 4(a) of the Smith Act held
that it was a crime to conspire to perform an act that would "substantially contribute" to the
establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States. Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 208 (1961). Section 4(f), the membership clause, held that it was not a per se
violation of section 4(a) to belong to a Communist organization. See id. at 207. In Scales, the
Court upheld the 1954 conviction of a member of the Communist Party of the United States.
See id Justice Harlan argued that the clause only punished membership when there was clear
proof that a defendant specifically intended to accomplish the aims of the Communist Party,
viz., to overthrow the government "as speedily as circumstances would permit." Id. at 229-30.
Harlan found that the evidence sufficiently proved this specific intent. See also Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (reversing conviction under the membership clause because
evidence did not support a finding that defendant presently advocated forcible overthrow of the
government). "IThe mere abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action." Id. at 297-98.
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Ohio,127  the Court declared an Ohio criminal-syndicalism statute
unconstitutional, and in so doing established the modem incitement formulation
of the CPD test. Under this test, the First Amendment does not protect incitement
to imminent lawless action.
The appellant in Brandenburg, the leader of a local Ohio Ku Klux Klan
chapter, invited a television reporter to attend a Klan rally, and a film taken by
the reporter of the rally, which later aired on television, showed hooded figures
setting fire to a cross and shouting slogans such as "Save America," "Send the
Jews back to Israel," and "Bury the niggers.' 2 ' The film also depicted a speech
in which the appellant stated, "We're not a revengent [sic] organization, but if
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white,
Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic]
taken."12
9
In reversing Brandenburg's conviction, the Supreme Court noted that while a
criminal-syndicalism statute like Ohio's had previously been upheld in Whitney,
later cases discredited Whitney. 30 The Court cited Dennis as the primary
discrediting case.' 3' The Court then reasoned that the later decisions, including
Dennis, had fashioned the relevant principle as follows:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
132
Because neither the statute nor the indictment nor the jury charge distinguished
between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action, the Court
found the statute unconstitutional, overruled Whitney, and reversed the
conviction.
33
The relationship between Brandenburg and Schenck is to a large degree in the
eye of the beholder.134 Professor Kalven, for example, took the position that the
modern incitement approach worked "pure" the doctrine of clear and present
127. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
128. Id. at 445-46 & n.1.
129. Id. at 446 (alterations added) (quotations omitted). Brandenburg was convicted and
sentenced to 10 years in prison for violating an Ohio statute that prohibited "'advocat[ing] ...
the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."' Id. at 444-45 (alteration and
omission in original) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Anderson 1953) (repealed
1974)).
130. See id at 447.
131. See id
132. Id (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 448-49.
134. See Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (1970) (stating that the Court's position
after Brandenburg remained "ambivalent"); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct
and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159,
1175 (1982) (stating that Brandenburg does not provide an "unambiguous explanation").
12331998]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
danger.' 31 Professor Gunther recently wrote that the Court in Brandenburg
belatedly vindicated Hand's Masses Publishing Co. approach.' 36 Professor
Smolla, on the other hand, has characterized the Brandenburg test as an
extension of the Holmes/Brandeis refinement of the CPD test. 117 Professor Wells
has even argued that the test reflects the Court's acceptance of a Kantian notion
of autonomy in First Amendment jurisprudence.'38 It is difficult to decide who
is right, in part because the Court has issued relatively few opinions dealing in
any substantive fashion with the modem incitement approach.'39 Those opinions
that the Court has issued have shed little to no light on the various ambiguities
present in Brandenburg.40
135. Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
235, 238 (1973).
136. See Gunther, supra note 76, at 750-55.
137. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 115 (1992).
138. See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the
Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159 (1997);
see also Freedman, supra note 7, at 907 (arguing that Brandenburg permits limitations on
speech "only where the speech will cause physical violence so iinmediately as to forestall the
ability of other voices to be heard, thus precluding the recipients of the message from making
.an autonomous decision on how to respond") (emphasis added). To the extent that Professor
Wells's contention is correct, then Brandenburg surely signals the death of clear and present
danger as envisioned by Holmes. Holmes, after all, was a Social Darwinist, who rejected Kant's
"moralistic 'dogma of equality."' Rabban, supra note 10, at 1268 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 43 (1946)).
139. But see Freedman, supra note 7, at 906 n.1 16 (claiming that the Court has never upheld
a conviction based on the modem incitement test). In fact, Professor Freedman claims that
Brandenburg has been used as a "rle... protect[ing] impassioned advocates of social change
operating in turbulent conditions." Id.
140. For example, the Court has been unclear as to what exactly constitutes an imminent
threat of harm. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). In Hess, the Court reversed a disorderly-conduct
conviction. The defendant was arrested at a demonstration when he yelled out, "We'll take the
fucking street later," as the local police were clearing the streets of demonstrators. Id. at 107.
The Court noted that "[a]t best.., the statement could be taken as counsel for present
moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some
indefinite future time." Id at 108. Similarly, in Clairborne Hardware Co., the Court reasoned
that when a few weeks separated potentially incendiary speeches from the violent reactions of
the listeners, the speech did not present an actionable threat. See Clairborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. at 928; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding
unconstitutional regulations prohibiting advertising of nonmedical contraceptives to persons
under 16).
As for the possible "legitimation" of illicit sexual behavior, whatever might be the
case if the advertisements directly incited illicit sexual activity among the young,
none of the advertisements in this record can even remotely be characterized as
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. . ." [because] [tihey
merely state the availability of products and services that are not only entirely
legal but constitutionally protected.
Id. at 701 (omission added) (citation omitted) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
457 (1969)).
In fact, Brandenburg has often been used as a tool of dissent. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding the plenary power of the Attorney General to deny a waiver of a
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Our view, however, is that it really does not matter who is right. For although
it may well be more difficult for the state to convict under Brandenburg than it
was under Schenck, the Brandenburg test has not succeeded in expurgating the
twin defects of Schenck: (1) it perpetuates a test rooted not in sound theory but
in historical paranoia; and (2) it continues to treat speech as action.
II. Two DEFECTS WITH EVEN THE MOST LIBERAL VERSION
OF THE CPD TEST
"'We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if
others are left free to demonstrate their errors and especially when the law
stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced by the false reasonings;
these are safer corrections than the conscience of the judge.""14'
Legal phenomena, like cultural phenomena generally, cannot be expected to
make sense when wrenched from their historical contexts.142 While it is nearly
impossible, in the aftermath of Vietnam, to imagine that the government has the
power to silence even the most inflammatory antiwar rhetoric, it cannot be
forgotten that the CPD test and its various permutations arose within the context
of war, or at the very least during periods of heightened political paranoia.' 43 In
other words, the CPD test assumes that the speech to be punished will undermine
democracy; it implies that too much speech will collapse the democratic state.
But, the simple truth of the matter is that there has never in the history of the
modem state been a democracy that collapsed due to the presence of too much
speech. Indeed, since the Enlightenment, the only states that systematically
suppress speech are states that fear democracy, not states where democracy
thrives.
144
In addition, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment reflects the
intuitive proposition that there is a distinction among thinking something, saying
statutory exclusion of an alien-in this case a Belgian journalist and Marxist theoretician-who
advocated or published Communist doctrine); id. at 773 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 863 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109, 131 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he only way to stop murders
and drug abuse is to punish them directly"); United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 716-17
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 688-89 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
141. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting
Charles A. Beard, The Great American Tradition: A Challenge for the Fourth of July, 123
NATION 7, 8 (1926) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elijah Boardman, New Milford,
Conn. (July 3, 1801))), overruled in part by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
142. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
3 (1969). "Karl Llewellyn has made us keenly aware of those highly specific differences in
legal styles that vary from culture to culture and from period to period." Id.
143. See Kalven, supra note 135, at 237 (stating that "[t]o put [Debs] in modem context, it
is somewhat as though George McGovern had been sent to prison for his criticism of the
[Vietnam] war").
144. We put to the side the controversial question of what constitutes a democracy. See
RONALD DWORKrN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 59-60 (1985).
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something, and doing something. 4 ' That is, although action can at times qualify
as speech, 4 6 and although speech is, in a sense, an action, 4 7 there is a strong
moral intuition that holds that saying something is different from doing
something. Saying that someone ought to be shot is different from shooting
someone; saying that banks should be robbed and the money redistributed to the
poor is different from robbing a bank. The CPD test, from its inception to the
present, ignores this powerful intuition, an intuition, moreover, that the Free
Speech Clause itself, in its unequivocal language, appears to embrace.
A. The CPD Test as a Paranoid Atavism
Perhaps no other figure of dissent resonates more powerfully in the late-
twentieth-century mind than the lone pedestrian blocking a phalanx of Chinese
tanks in route to Tiananmen Square. What this and other images from the
Chinese summer of 1989141 illustrate is the extent to which a tyrannous political
body will act in order to silence disagreement. Ironically, Article 35 of the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China declares that "'[c]itizens of the
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly,
of association, of procession and of demonstration." 149 Consequently, even at
the most visceral level, watching Chinese troops raze the Goddess of
Democracy 5 ' refutes the fundamental assumption of the CPD test: that speech
can endanger a democratic system. Rather, these images illustrate, better than
thousands of words, that speech, particularly dissenting speech, is a prerequisite
for democracy and that speech poses a greater threat to nondemocratic systems.''
Indeed, when the Soviets removed Alexander Dubcek from political office
during the "Prague Spring" of 1968, they were attempting to stifle reform; they
were trying to shut Dubcek up. Ironically, during the autumn of 1989, amid a
flood of pro-democracy protests in Wenceslaus Square, the Czechoslovakian
Politburo dissolved, and Dubcek once again spoke.
Judge Easterbrook has written:
A belief may be pernicious-the beliefs of Nazis led to the death of millions,
those of the Klan to the repression of millions. A pernicious belief may
prevail. Totalitarian governments today rule much of the planet, practicing
suppression of billions and spreading dogma that may enslave others. One of
145. See infra Part II.B.
146. As a doctrinal proposition, this assertion is commonly associated with cases like United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (treating the burning of a draft card as speech).
147. That is, the actual muscular contractions which force air through the vocal cords and
produce the sounds recognized as speech.
148. In the summer of 1989, millions of Chinese students and citizens amassed in Tiananmen
Square in Beijing, China, seeking democratic reform.
149. SMOLLA, supra note 137, at 349 (alteration added) (quoting YXANFA art. 35 (1982)).
150. One of the symbols created by the demonstrators was the Goddess of Democracy, a 33-
foot-high statue that resembled the Statue of Liberty.
151. See WILTSHIRE, supra note 6, at I I ("The presence of free speech does not ensure
good government. Its absence, however, does ensure totalitarianism.").
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the things that separates our society from theirs is our absolute right to
propagate opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful. 52
Judge Posner has taken exception to Judge Easterbrook's view and to what he
terms "judicial rhapsodi[zing] of free speech." s3 "Indeed," writes Posner, "the
suggestion that the first amendment ties our hands in dealing with Nazi and
communist revolutionaries . . . is an unintended intimation of that most
frightening of constitutional conceptions: the Constitution as a suicide pact."' 4
But Posner errs in thinking that Easterbrook's view conceives of the Constitution
as a suicide pact, and his error is precisely the same error that the CPD test
embodies: Judge Posner, like Judge Hand and Justices Holmes and Brandeis (not
to mention lesser mortals), ignores the pivotal distinction between action and
speech. That the Constitution permits anything to be said does not entail that it
permits anything to be done.
The concept of democracy dates back to ancient Athens, and essential to
Athenian democracy was isegoria, or the equal right to speak.'5 5 Demosthenes
characterized isegoria as follows: "The fundamental difference between the
Athenian and the Spartan constitutions is that in Athens you are free to praise the
Spartan constitution, whereas in Sparta you are not allowed to praise any
constitution other than the Spartan."'56 While isegoria granted each citizen the
right to address the various political bodies in Athens, it was not an individual
right in the sense that we would consider the right to free expression today.'57
Rather, the concept of isegoria acted as a fundamental component of good
government.158 Consequently, Demosthenes argued against the repression of
isegoria, not because it would infringe on the individual citizen's right to self-
expression, but because it would impede the progress of city government.'59
Throughout the evolution of the CPD test, the same dilemma arose in each
case: Do speakers who express opposition to democracy have the right to express
such opposition even if it might lead to the destruction of the democratic state?
Virtually all of the justices answered no. For instance, Justice Sanford premised
his decisions in Gitlow and Whitney on the state's "essential" right of self-
preservation. 60 Even Hand, Holmes, and Brandeis accepted this premise,
152. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985) (en
banc).
153. Posner, supra note 71, at 7.
154. Id.
155. See WILTSHIRE, supra note 6, at 112.
156. Id. at 113 (quotations omitted).
157. See id. at 112. Professor Smolla details the various societies today that recognize the
freedom of speech as a human right, rather than a component of good government. See
SMOLLA, supra note 137, at 347-51. The purpose of this essay is not to answer the riddle
whether the freedom of speech is an individual right or a component of good government.
Rather, we simply argue that the premise that too much speech can undermine a democratic
state is, at bottom, false.
158. See WILTSHIRE, supra note 6, at 112.
159. See id. at 113.
160. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.




disagreeing merely with the imminence of the danger posed to the state by certain
speech. 61 Thus, throughout the evolution of the CPD test, the point of departure
among the various judges appears to have been one of fear: How much fear must
the state experience before it has the power to silence the speaker? Whereas
Sanford would have accepted the suppression of speech tending to make a
legislature slightly nervous, Brandeis and Holmes demanded at least some
substantiation of the legislature's fear.
Even substantiated fear, however, may amount to nothing more than
rationalized paranoia. Yet rather than confront this possibility, judges have
tended to hyperbolize supposed threats. For example, Judge Hand portrayed the
battle against Communism as the New Crusade. Comparing the Communist threat
to the spread of Islam, Hand infused the convictions of the eleven leaders of the
Communist Party of America with a sense of holiness. The reality was actually
quite different, however, for Communism never truly posed a serious threat to
American internal affairs. Even so, fervent anti-Communism was an expression
of faith. During this era, as the CPD test became embedded in doctrine, Chief
Justice Vinson literally saw the seeds of a "putsch" in every dissent. 62 (The
rhetoric in the opinions of this era repays rereading. It seems fair to say that
many of the decisions affirming the punishment of speech appear to have
expended more energy devising incendiary metaphors than accurately assessing
the danger posed by various utterances.) 63 Only Justice Douglas recognized the
reality that Communism in America never posed any real threat to the democratic
system.'64
Notably, when confronted with the same dilemma, Athenian isegoria favored
the freedom of threatening speech as less of a danger than the potential effects
of stifling such speech. ' This is not to say that the Athenians did not devise
methods of suppression. For instance, Athens punished libel with monetary
fines. 66 The Athenians also adhered to a strict standard of accountability and
practiced ostracism when certain politicians became too powerful.' 67 Despite
these methods of suppression, however, two things become very clear. First, the
Athenians devised a democracy, in structure and practice, "so that in Aristotle's
observation... 'all citizens deliberate about all matters."" 68 Second, unlike the
architects of the CPD test, the Athenians assumed that free expression, even
threatening expression, was necessary for the continuation of a democratic
161. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73
(Holmes, J., dissenting); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341
U.S. 494.
162. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509 (emphasis in original).
163. See, e.g., id at 511 (noting the "inflammable nature of world conditions"); Gitlow, 268
U.S. at 669 ("A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may
burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration."); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204, 209 (1919) (arguing that the publication was circulated "in quarters where a little breath
would be enough to kindle a flame").
164. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 588 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
165. See WILTSHIRE, supra note 6, at 113.
166. See id. at 115.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 116.
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state. 69 Aristotle and the Athenians may well have exaggerated the value of
prolific speech or political participation, but Holmes and the creators of the CPD
test exaggerated the danger that speech can pose to democratic politics.
B. The CPD Test as a Moral Failure
Laws properly enacted can still be immoral; wars properly declared can still be
unjust. Any theory of the Free Speech Clause that restricts the liberty of
individuals to insist that certain laws are unethical or that certain wars are unjust
is a fatally flawed theory. Yet no theory, as the history of the CPD test tends to
prove, is capable of treating some speech as action, thereby punishing it, without
flowing ineluctably into this fatal flaw.
When Judge Hand attempted in Masses Publishing Co. 7 o to draw a distinction
between advocacy (or persuasion), on the one hand, and incitement, on the other,
he was trying to preserve both the freedom of individuals to criticize and the
power of the state to punish. But his effort and all subsequent efforts have failed
for two reasons. The first (and less interesting) is that the line between advocacy
and incitement is primarily a function of the listener, not the speaker.'7 ' The
second reason, and the one we focus on here, is that all such efforts collapse the
basic moral distinction between speech and action, between saying something
and doing it.
It is true that the modem incitement approach is based on specific intent. This
means that not only must the speech be likely to incite or produce lawlessness,
but the speech must be directed toward inciting or producing lawlessness. And
it is also true that under the modem approach, any alleged danger presented by
certain speech must be imminent, rather than merely possible or even likely. Even
so, the test continues to blur the morally and legally salient distinction between
action and speech. Every generation has its own proponents of this gambit; every
generation has its own cadre of silencers. Whereas members of the political right
sought to quiet speech a generation ago, today's proponents of silencing are as
likely to be from the political left. The forces allied against pornography, for
example, comprise an odd assortment of leftists and rightists; and the proponents
of removing First Amendment protection for so-called "hate speech" are
typically from the political left.'72 What all these silencers have in common is that
they, too, embrace the fallacy that lies at the heart of the CPD test: the
proposition that speech is action, or so close to action that it can be punished as
such.
169. See id.
170. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
171. Courts attempt to objectify this distinction by asking, for example, whether certain
words would incite the reasonable listener. This gambit can succeed, but only at the cost of
silencing radical speech and, more important, by negating the moral distinction between saying
and doing (the second reason addressed in the text). For a fuller development of the moral
argument put forward here see David R. Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and Present
Danger Test, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. (forthcoming 1998).
172. Professor Fiss has observed that the traditional alliance of political liberals has been
shattered by divisions over the First Amendment. See Fiss, supra note 6, at 1-6.
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1. A Preliminary Caveat
At the outset it is important to emphasize that the moral criticism we level here
against the clear and present danger doctrine does not flow in both directions.
Saying that speech is not an action does not imply that, for doctrinal purposes,
action cannot be protected by the Free Speech Clause. Consequently, the fact that
it is wrong as a normative (and constitutional) matter to treat words as conduct
does not by any means cast any doubt on the line of cases which hold that certain
conduct must be protected as speech.
173
In Texas v. Johnson," for example, the Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute which punished the desecration of the American flag, reasoning that the
act of burning a flag is protected as speech. The State argued a version of the
CPD test: Although burning a flag may be speech, the State maintained, it is
speech which could deeply offend onlookers; therefore, the law against flag
desecration actually protects the public from potential breaches of the peace. In
rejecting the State's argument, the Court made the point that is actually sharp
enough to shred the entirety of the CPD test. The Court observed that even
though certain breaches of the peace may occur when a flag is burned, the state
has available to it the apparatus to punish those who in fact breach the peace. The
First Amendment protects speech; if people, hearing certain speech, react
lawlessly, the state has the power to punish them for their lawless actions, rather
than the speaker to whom they are reacting.'75
The doctrinal strand of the First Amendment that treats certain conduct as
protected speech rests on the basic premise that speech is communication, and
certain conduct serves primarily, if not exclusively, as a means of
communication. This premise is manifestly correct. However, it has no bearing
on our thesis, which is that speech--or, more generally, communication-is not
action; and that the First Amendment protects communication (as distinguished
from action) absolutely. 76
173. The line of cases begins with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Commenting on this case, Professor Ely praised the Court for abandoning the speech-conduct
distinction. That may be a good idea where the speech or conduct is communicative; however,
as we argue in the text, that may not be so good an idea when used to control speech (rather
than merely conduct). See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495
(1975).
174. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
175. It is true that Texas's breach-of-peace statutes were already in existence when the
decision was handed down. This raises the question whether the outcome might have been
different had there not already been valid breach-of-peace statutes on the books. While this
might be an interesting question to pursue, the answer is irrelevant to our argument. What is
essential is that the state punish conduct as such, rather than collapse speech into conduct as
a method of punishing the speech.
176. We do not argue, however, that it is beyond the power of the state to regulate speech,
such as by placing reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.
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2. Saying and Doing
"Every idea is an incitement," wrote Holmes." There is nothing worth saying
that might not cause some listener to take action, action that may well be
unlawful. A listener who hears a Byron poem may become a radical
environmentalist, inspired to assassinate political leaders whom the listener
perceives as hostile to the environment. Yet Holmes was not exactly correct. For
not every idea is an incitement; but every idea might be, and any idea can be.
Nevertheless, it is the act which the law must punish, rather than the ostensible
trigger (or cause) of the act. Partly this is true because we can never be sure
about what the trigger actually is,'78 but the more powerful reason why this is true
is that saying that speech can be coupled with the bad act that it assertedly
causes, and then punished exactly as the act is, is an idea that is at war with the
very core of the Free Speech Clause itself. Justice Douglas succinctly made this
point nearly a generation ago. Concurring in Brandenburg, he wrote, "[t]he line
between what may be made permissible and not subject to control and what is
impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt
acts.' 79
The Free Speech Clause is couched in unequivocal and absolute terms:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... ,,10 What
best explains this categorical rule-the words "no law"-is a normative intuition
held in our culture today and among the Framers centuries ago: $peech is
different from action. At the neurobiological level, there may well be no
difference between thinking something, saying something, and doing something.
But within the ontology of American law, both civil and criminal, the distinction
is pivotal.''
177. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
178. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
179. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 716-17 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 262-75 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also appears to
have shared the view we express in the immediately preceding section: namely, that the test
itself can be explained as a disproportionate response to the prevalent mood of fear which so
permeated the era. "Though I doubt if the 'clear and present danger' test is congenial to the
First Amendment in time of a declared war," he wrote, "I am certain it is not reconcilable with
the First Amendment in days of peace." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Moreover, Justice Douglas realized that the threats punished under the CPD test
"were often loud but always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to the status quo
that critical analysis made them nervous." Id. at 454 (Douglas, J., concurring) (italics in
original).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free
Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 110 (1982). But see Posner, supra note 71, at 3-5
(concluding that the language of the Free Speech Clause is "indefinite and noncommittal").
181. See generally FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993). For a discussion of this point in the context of criminal law generally, see WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & AusTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3.1 to 3.4 (2d ed. 1986), Richard C.
Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245
(1992), and Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on
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The First Amendment mandates that only overt acts may be punished. More
generally, three factors must be present in order to justify punishing an
individual. The first is that the individual must have acted; the second is that the
action must have caused harm; and the third is that the individual must be
culpable. Each of these criteria presents well-known philosophical difficulties,
and we do not propose to revisit the entire moral terrain presented by these
issues. Rather, our essential claim is that the Free Speech Clause itself resolves
these complicated matters where speech is at issue.
The first criterion, for example, implicates the problematic distinction between
action and inaction. When is not acting tantamount to acting? Charles Fried has
givei the example of the pedestrian who sees a swimmer drowning, but declines
to throw the swimmer the nearby life preserver because it is freshly painted and
the pedestrian does not want to soil his clothes. "2 Has the pedestrian acted or
refrained from acting? Bentham characterized inaction (or what he called "acts
of omission") as "negative" actions on the ground that an individual who
declines to act has nonetheless performed an act of will.'83 In the context of
speech, if inaction is action, would a refusal to persuade potential rioters not to
riotbe punishable? Why should a speaker who says "Let's start looting" be liable
(whether as criminal or as tortfeasor) while a speaker who declines to say "Let's
not loot" not be? This is not an easy question in the context of existing First
Amendment doctrine, which holds that the speaker who urges the masses to riot
is liable.'84 In contrast, under a theory of the text which holds, as we propose,
that no speech is punishable, the question cannot even arise.
The second factor that must be present to justify punishment is causation.
Irrespective of one's view on the tenability of the distinction between action and
inaction, an individual is not morally blameworthy unless her action causes
Criminal Justice, 93 MIC. L. REV. 1915 (1995). For a discussion of the idea in the context of
tort law, see Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility:
Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 553, 578 (1987). For a
discussion of the breakdown of this idea, see Craig Calhoun, Social Theory and the Law:
Systems Theory, Normative Justification, and Postmodernism, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 398, 449
(1989). There is a sense in which theorists who argue for greater emphasis on communal
responsibility for various phenomena are arguing against the theory of the First Amendment
put forth in this essay. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and Boundaries of the Self,
105 HARV. L. REv. 959 (1992); Jtlrgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's
Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38, 42 (1989).
182. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 52 (1978).
183. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
75-76 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789). Gilbert Ryle, however, has argued that
one's will cannot be separated from action. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 62-84
(1949).
184. Nor is it easy in view of the modem trend in many areas of law, from criminal law to
tort law, to punish actors who fail or neglect to prevent harm. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The
Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 266-67 (1980).
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harm.' Causation is a notoriously complicated notion.'86 Moral philosophers
have expended great energies stating the conditions under which an individual
can be said to cause certain harm.8 7 Other philosophers, beginning perhaps with
Thomas Nagel, have argued that the question of causation is morally irrelevant
because the question of whether a certain action causes external harm is typically
susceptible to "moral luck," that is, to factors which the individual cannot
control.'88 When Holmes and Hand ask whether speech threatens imminent harm,
they are asking a question about causation, about the closeness of the nexus
between words and deeds. Law as a whole cannot avoid the morass of causation,
of course, 9 but the theory of the First Amendment we endorse here makes the
issue of causation entirely irrelevant when all the actor has done is speak. The
issue of imminence will never arise.
For example, it is possible that when Tupac Shakur recorded the record that
Ronald Howard was listening to in the moments before he committed murder,
Shakur himself might have been imagining murder. He might have imagined that
people who heard his music would become murderous. He might even have been
advocating murder. But regardless of whether he was imagining any of these
things, he did not act; all he did was communicate. If a murder follows a song,
then even if we can bridge the impossibly deep causation cavern and say that the
song caused the murder-even if we can say that Shakur's lyrics caused Howard
to act-we still have not dissolved the distinction between singing and
shooting. 9 ° By presuming as a fixed axiom that speech is not action, the First
Amendment completely circumvents the impossibly complex issues of
185. The law of attempts might be said to punish potential harm, and for this very reason it
is philosophically problematic. It is ordinarily justified, however, by a pragmatic theory that
holds that potentially harmful conduct ought to be punished even where the actor fortuitously
causes no injury so as to deter others from engaging in such risky activity.
186. The essential work here is H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d
ed. 1985).
187. A superb treatment of the issues is found in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING
(1970). See also John Casey, Actions and Consequences, in MORALITY AND MORAL
REASONING 155 (John Casey ed., 1971); Elliott Sober, Apportioning Causal Responsibility,
85 J. PHIL. 303 (1988).
188. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1979); Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and
Moral Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374 (1987).
189. On the other hand, some philosophers have certainly argued that causation is irrelevant
to the issue of blameworthiness. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, I Could Not Have Done
Otherwise-So What?, 81 J. PHIL. 553, 553 (1984) ("I assert that it simply does not matter at
all to moral responsibility whether the agent in question could have done otherwise in the
circumstances.").
190. For examples of civil suits filed, arguing that music caused harm, see generally Waller
v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (dismissing wrongful-death suit filed by
parents after son committed suicide after repeatedly listening to the music of heavy-metal
singer Ozzy Osboume), aff'd without opinion, 958 F.2d 1084 (1 th Cir. 1992), and McCollum
v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988) (same). In each of these cases, the trial and
appellate courts correctly found that the First Amendment barred the plaintiffs' claims because
the defendants did not engage in culpable incitement to suicide.
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causation. 9 ' Ronald Howard does not even get to try to establish that Tupac
Shakur "caused" him to murder Officer Bill Davidson, because what Tupac did
was speak. Tupac communicated; Howard acted.
There is only one exception to the potent firewall that the First Amendment
erects between speech and action. That exception, which lies within the third
requirement for punishment, is satisfied when the speaker, through his or her
speech, overwhelms the individual listener's will. The third factor that must be
present for punishment to be justified requires that the individual who acted and
caused harm be legally blameworthy. To be sure, legal responsibility and moral
responsibility do not always walk hand in hand. The law may deem someone not
responsible who strikes us as in fact being morally responsible; conversely, the
law may deem legally responsible an individual who seems morally blameless.'92
Nevertheless, what law and morality have in common is the requirement of
blameworthiness, even though the criteria for satisfying this condition may not
overlap in these two domains with perfect precision. Our contention here is that
when the listener has in fact had her will overborne by the speaker, then it is apt
to say that the speaker has acted in a culpable fashion.'93
When a speaker says to a listener that he will pay her a certain sum of money
if she murders someone, then (apart from the question of whether a promise of
future payment is tantamount to present action) the speaker might well succeed
in overcoming the listener's will. But if that is so, then the listener's legal
culpability will be accordingly diminished. Or, to return to our case of Tupac
Shakur, suppose that Shakur had kidnapped Ronald Howard and hypnotized him
and, during the hypnosis, implanted the command that Howard do exactly what
Shakur commanded. Under such a scenario, Howard would be permitted to argue
that the rap lyrics he was listening to constituted a command from Shakur, which
command Howard was incapable of ignoring;9 and under such circumstances,
191. As one commentator has recently (and correctly) observed: "[t]here is no proof that
emotions or sudden external provocations can truly overcome our ability to make moral choices
(e.g., not to kill someone)." Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individual
Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1168 (1997).
192. See FEINBERG, supra note 187, at 30.
193. See HART & HONOR, supra note 186, at 58, 143-44.
194. The operative fact here is that Howard must be incapable of resisting Tupac's
command; he cannot but follow it. Take as another example the case of Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996). In Rice, the defendant published a book
called "Hit Man," which essentially provided step-by-step instructions on planning and
carrying out a murder. When James Perry killed three Maryland residents by following the
instructions in Hit Man, the family members of the victims sued the defendant-publisher for
wrongful death. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
finding that, inter alia, the publication of Hit Man did not satisfy the Brandenburg test because
it did not command the reader to go out and commit murder now. Instead, explained the court,
the book simply provided information regarding murder upon which the reader could act if he
so chose. While we agree with the ultimate holding of the cofirt, the distinction that the court
made is somewhat chimerical without recognizing our basic premise. Whether a speaker
advises or commands a listener to commit a lawless act is irrelevant if the speaker has not
overborne the listener's will such that the speaker conflates his will with the listener's.
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a jury might choose to acquit Howard. Under this scenario, Howard is just a
robot, an extension of Shakur; under this scenario, Shakur is the actor.
What this illustration also demonstrates is the symmetry between those cases
where the speaker has conquered the listener's will and those cases where the
listener is deemed insufficiently responsible for an act to merit punishment. That
is to say, Howard cannot escape punishment, and Shakur cannot face
punishment,'95 unless it can be shown that Shakur's lyrics overwhelmed
Howard's will. One can view this issue mathematically: A certain quantum of
legal blameworthiness attaches to every bad act. That quantum can be divided
among several actors, but it is not possible for the entire quantum to be assigned
to more than one actor.
This view of blameworthiness which we locate in the Free Speech Clause is
classically Aristotlian. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that we
blame individuals for their actions which cause harm when two conditions are
satisfied: First, the action must indeed be bad, and second, the action must have
been voluntary (or, perhaps more precisely, not involuntary).'96 By "action"
Aristotle manifestly means some physical act (as distinguished from speech); in
addition, it is telling that the major focus of Aristotle's effort is to make clear
what is meant by voluntary (and to explain how voluntariness is a crucial aspect
of blameworthiness). In a sense, Aristotle is addressing a version of the problem
of free will,'97 a matter which has consumed theologians as well as moral
philosophers for millenia. 8 And Aristotle's project reveals the same sensibility
displayed in almost all discussions of free will: Unless the individual who did
something bad acted volitionally, then it is morally troublesome to punish her.
Aristotle defines a voluntary act as one where the "initiative lies with the agent
who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed."'99
One could of course construct a hypothetical where the act of speaking failed to
satisfy this definition of voluntariness. A defendant who confesses to a crime
under duress or coercion has spoken involuntarily. A hostage who on videotape
expresses love for her captors while her captors aim rifles at her head has spoken
involuntarily. But these are distractions. When an individual speaks in the public
domain and invokes the First Amendment to protect that speech, the speech is
presumptively voluntary. The fact that moral philosophy simply does not pay any
attention to the possibility that speech might be involuntary (in the same way that
action might be involuntary) signals an important normative fact: Speech is not
195. By punishment, we assume that a finding of tort liability may include some element of
punishment.
196. We have used the Martin Ostwald translation of ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 52
(Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (n.d.). We have also relied heavily on Professor Smiley's lucid
treatment of the issues. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES
OF COMMUNITY 37-57 (1992).
197. Smiley argues, however, that Aristotle was not "concerned primarily with free will."
SMILEY, supra note 196, at 39.
198. The collected works in DETERMINISM, FREE WILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Gerald
Dworkin ed., 1970), provide a fine treatment. See also HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 95-103 (1988).
199. ARISTOTLE, supra note 196, at 57.
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action."0 If speech were action, it would be necessary to determine whether
conditions of voluntariness are satisfied when speech is the first factor in a
causal chain which terminates in some harm or injury. Instead, Aristotle, and
moral philosophers in general, take for granted that the act of speaking is a
voluntary matter.
Why, then, in philosophical discussions of blameworthiness (from Aristotle to
the present) is it not a simple matter to punish a speaker whose speech initiates
a chain of events culminating in harm? Insofar as the act is voluntary, the issue
of blameworthiness would be clear, but for one fact. That fact-that normative,
and constitutional, fact-is that the act of speaking simply is never regarded as
sufficient to cause the kind of harm that the law addresses. There must be, in
addition to the speech (the communication), some further act. It is this further act
which, assuming the actor is blameworthy, subjects someone to punishment.
That is why the Free Speech Clause dictates that the actor (rather than the
speaker) be punished. The state may never permissibly punish a speaker as a
culpable actor unless the speaker: (1) specifically intended to cause an unlawful
injury, (2) proximately caused that unlawful injury, and (3) exerted a power over
the listener so profound that the listener herself could not be held morally
accountable for her actions.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, the legal conclusion we trumpet will not necessarily coincide with
our moral conclusions. An individual may escape legal liability yet remain
morally blameworthy for some set of events which results from her speech.20 ' But
this fact is passd; 20 2 that there are distinctions between the rule of law and
morality does not have any impact on whether speech, even morally opprobrious
speech, is shielded by the clear and unambiguous language of the First
Amendment. In part this may be because of serious reservations about the
causation between word and deed; in part it may result from the legal status of
the free-speech guarantee. Whatever the etiology, the First Amendment rests on
the solid ethical foundation that distinguishes between word and deed.
The path from speech to action is always mediated by will. Faced with even the
most inspiring rhetoric, the listener has a will of her own. Whether listening to
the turgid rhetoric of another Hitler or admiring the smooth syntax of a poet such
as Cummings, the listener chooses to act or not to act. That decision, that
exercise of will, is punishable. The rhetoric, the poetry, never is. That is what the
Free Speech Clause means.
200. It merits emphasis at this point that our claim is that the law anticipated by the Free
Speech Clause can punish only action, but a cogent moral theory may punish speech with equal
force. See, e.g., FRANKFURT, supra note 198, at 98-100 (describing the failure to call the police
after witnessing an accident as morally significant even if downed phone line would have
prevented the speech in any event).
201. See FEINBERG, supra note 187, at 25-37.
202. See David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case ofArticle
V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18 & n.76 (1990).
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